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Offshore Wind Farms (OWFs) have rising importance for energy provision of many regions worldwide. 
However, their harsh environment leads to considerably higher failure rates and degradation compared to its 
onshore counterparts. Consequently, OWFs require well-established maintenance processes in order to provide 
required operational availability of all wind turbines. Amongst the several factors impacting these processes the 
personnel plays an important role, bearing in mind that no maintenance is possible without having access to 
technicians or seamen operating the required vessel. This work proposes a comprehensive model for evaluating 
the actual impact the personnel availability has on the corrective maintenance processes of an OWF and, 
consequently, its energy production. Therefore, maintenance processes and WT failure rates based on reported 
data are considered. Furthermore, a pandemic model is employed in order to elaborate the possible impact a 
health crisis can have on the operational availability of an OWF. Results indicate that the monthly energy 
production can drop by up to 74% in case of a constant reduction of the personnel by 50%, while a worst case 
pandemic scenario results in a 23% lower energy production over the whole year. 
Keywords: Offshore Wind Farm, Maintenance, Modelling, Pandemic, Maritime Systems. 
1. Introduction  
With annual growth rates of nearly 30%, the 
offshore wind industry continuously increases its 
importance for energy provision, O’Sullivan 
(2020). For example, the total offshore wind 
energy production in Europe in 2019 was 
67TWh, which corresponded to 2.3% of the total 
EU electricity consumption, Komusanac et al. 
(2020). Furthermore, it is predicted that by 2030 
the offshore wind power will be responsible for 
8% of the total ocean economy adding USD 230 
billion of value, OECD (2016). 
Offshore Wind Farms (OWFs) are complex 
infrastructures located in harsh environments, 
such that well-established maintenance 
processes are required in order to guarantee high 
operational availability. Several factors impact 
these processes, e.g. weather conditions, 
availability of spare parts or available 
maintenance vessels. The recent COVID-19 
pandemic crisis highlighted another important 
factor – the number of available personnel. This 
can be affected not only by health issues, but 
also by organizational problems, strikes, 
bankruptcies etc. 
There are several scientific articles discussing 
maintenance process modelling in OWFs, e.g. 
Chan and Mo (2017); Gutschi et al. (2019); 
Sahnoun, M. et al. (2019). However, to the best 
of our knowledge, there has been no work 
published that analyses the impact of the 
changing personnel availability on the 
maintenance processes and consequently on the 
operational availability of an OWF. Based on 
this observation, the intention of this work is the 
conception a model that enables such an 
analysis. This model can be a powerful tool for 
comparing the outcome of different adverse 
events leading to a reduction of the available 
personnel and of potential countermeasures. 
The rest of this work is structured as follows. 
Section 2 discusses basic information about the 
structure of OWF and related maintenance 
processes. Section 3 presents the personnel-
dependent maintenance model, while Section 4 
discusses exemplary results. Finally, Section 5 
concludes this work. 
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2. Preliminaries  
2.1 OFFSHORE WIND FARMS  
OWFs are complex cyber-physical systems with 
human interaction exhibiting an automated main 
operational mode. As such, OWFs possess all 
the basic traits common of critical 
infrastructures, Sansavini (2017); Schütt (2014); 
Lichte and Wolf (2019). Multiple interacting 
layers exist with multiple interdependences 
between them – physical structures, energy 
conversion, measurement alongside with control 
and protection (automation), manual operation 
and maintenance (O&M), management. 
Accordingly different interacting flows are 
produced and distributed within the system 
boundary and across it – energy, information 
(signals/data), vehicles, people, replacement 
parts, maintenance services – through which the 
function and the operation are ensured. The main 
OWF elements as physical structures are: Wind 
Turbines (WTs), offshore and onshore 
substations, control and O&M centre as well as 
power and communication cables.  
The operation, functionality and performance of 
an infrastructure can be represented by 
functional models characterizing the interaction 
of the above mentioned layers and flows. These 
models describe the technical behavior of the 
system in relation to its intended task or result. 
Such a generic OWF model was presented in 
Kulev et al. (2019). Accordingly, in this paper 
we investigate the influence of the change of the 
maintenance process (flows), due to the reduced 
personnel availability, on the energy provision 
process (flow) as a consequence of the 
interaction. 
Different system states can be assigned to the 
values of parameters (operational parameters) 
pertaining to the flows and to the required 
conditions (operating/environmental/work) in 
relation to the requirements. However, regarding 
the energy provision within the OWF we 
consider only system states depending on the 
wind speed and the failures of the main WT 
components, as the single cause for the 
degradation of the energy provision.   
This degradation can not only impact the 
produced energy by the OWF but its operational 
safety and its ability to fulfill the grid 
requirements, too.  One of these requirements is 
the so called Fault Ride-Through (FRT) 
capability. Our simulations with the modified 
wind farm models provided within Simscape 
Electrical by MathWorks show that a reduced 
number of operating WTs leads to a reduced 
FRT capability. A voltage drop with a given 
magnitude at the grid connection point which 
can be endured with all WTs functioning leads 
to an OWF downtime if 1/3 of the WTs operate. 
A 3-phase short-circuit disturbance at the remote 
end of the export cable (away from the WTs) 
cannot be endured by the OWF when only 2/3 of 
WTs are operational. 
2.2 OWF Maintenance processes 
In general, one can distinguish two types of 
O&M processes: preventive maintenance and 
corrective maintenance. According to IEC 
(2015), preventive maintenance is carried out to 
mitigate the degradation and to reduce the 
probability of failure. The preventive 
maintenance can be further classified as 
condition-based or scheduled maintenance. The 
condition-based maintenance is carried out based 
on item condition and/or forecast of the 
condition degradation. Scheduled maintenance is 
carried out in accordance with a specified time 
schedule. These schedules can be developed 
with regard to, among others, prediction of wind 
turbine degradation, wind turbine manufacturer 
guidelines, spare parts availability or support 
vessels/item accessibility. In case of a WT, a 
typical preventive maintenance intervention 
consists of a thorough inspection of the entire 
system, replacement of fluids, lubrication and 
servicing of mechanical parts, Chan and Mo 
(2017). 
The scheduling process is even more 
complicated when one takes into account 
failures, which are in the domain of corrective 
maintenance. It is worth mentioning that all 
maintenance tasks are concurrent processes 
competing against each other for a pool of 
resources.  
One of the most important factors that have an 
influence on the WT and ipso facto on the OWF 
maintenance is weather. The influence is a 
subject of discussion in Battisti et al. (2006); 
Carroll et al. (2016); and Wilkie and Galasso 
(2020). In this paper, it is also considered as a 
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major constraint on the performance of 
maintenance tasks. In the context of various 
transportation units (e.g. FSV – Fast Supply 
Vessel, helicopters) or available technology (e.g. 
W2W – Walk to Work, de-icing systems) 
acceptable weather conditions may vary. In case 
of basic models of FSVs, the main weather 
factor is described as a significant wave height. 
Operational condition for that parameter is set to 
< 2 m. However, for the research purpose other 
weather indicators are introduced: wind speed, 
temperature and ambient light. Moreover, among 
many not weather-related parameters, presented 
example scenarios incorporate the distance of 
the transport vessel to the offshore installation. 
All these aspects form a meaningful interaction 
with the maintenance process. 
3. Personnel-dependent maintenance model 
This section presents the developed maintenance 
model for the analysis of the impact of available 
human resources on the fulfillment of 
maintenance. Fig. 1 depicts a general overview 
that shall be discussed in the following 
subsections 
3.1 OWF Maintenance model 
Fig. 2 depicts the process and information flow 
in the O&M model domain. The major signals 
considered in this case are: weather conditions 
and available human resources. 
The weather data used in the model are based on 
National Data Buoy Center (NDBC) of National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA), NOAA (2019). In addition, the second 
source of weather data was used as a test – UFS 
"German Bight", DWD (2016). Both of those 
data sources provide one year weather 
information related to similar geographical 
latitude: NDBC station 46083 - 58°16’N, UFS 
“German Bight” - 54°10’N. There is also an 
option in the model to use artificial weather 
generators. Apart from typical meteorological 
measure data sets, the model includes such 
phenomena as nautical and civil twilight based 
on 54°N latitude. All of the weather data sets are 
considered as discrete values with a one hour 
resolution. In the course of the simulation run, 
the weather data are called at various points, e.g. 
when the vessel needs to outbound to the 
offshore installation, when the maintenance 
process proceeds, or when there is a need to 
calculate an estimation time of arrival. The 
weather conditions can delay the tasks and 
procedures connected to the O&M processes. 
The O&M discrete event model uses a number 
of resource pools, e.g. Fast Service Vessel (FSV) 
pool, Heavy Lift Vessel (HLV) pool, personnel 
pool. The construction of the failure model and 
 
Fig. 1. Schematic overview of the O&M concept 
 
Fig. 2. Simplified schema of the O&M model 
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its implication for the O&M model are presented 
in sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. One should note that 
this model shall not represent the detailed 
execution of maintenance tasks, but to enable a 
global analysis of factors that influence 
maintenance activities.  
The model provides following established KPIs: 
Operational Availability (OA) and Mean Time 
To Repair (MTTR), both described by the 
EN 15341 norm as T2 and T21 indicators 
respectively, BSI (2007). As a result of OA and 
wind speed data implementation, it is possible to 
estimate OWF energy provision, as described in 
section 3.2.1. 
3.2 WT Degradation model 
3.2.1 OWF energy provision model and 
degradation 
Regarding the energy provision, we differentiate 
four WT system states in terms of the power 
flow, depending on the wind speed and presence 
of failures: full load operational, partial load 
operational,   non-operational due to out-of-
range wind speeds and dysfunctional (down-
time) due to a main component failure and 
maintenance, Schütt (2014). 
The ratio of the power POWF(t) fed at given time t 
into the grid by an OWF with N WTs to the 
maximal possible power OWF POWFR can be 
expressed as a dependence on the wind speed 
and the operating conditions by following 
approximation, Schütt (2014): 
    ( )
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with Ci(t) as a utilization coefficient of the i-th 
WT according to the control/protection strategy 
regarding the wind speed vi(t) and the fault 
conditions/maintenance. The exponent mi is a 
control parameter depending on the wind speed. 
The constant vR is the rated wind speed, with a 
typical value vR = 13 m/s chosen by us. The 
maximal possible POWFR is the power generated 
by all WTs by vi(t)= vR. So Ci(t) can have only 2 
values - 0 and 1. A zero value occurs in case of  
WT main component failures/maintenance and 
by wind speeds outside of the range [vcin, vout] 
where vcin is the cut-in speed (typical value is  
vcin = 3.5 m/s) and vcout is the cut-out speed 
(typical value is vcout = 25 m/s). A value of 1 is 
assigned by operational WT and wind speeds 
within the [vcin, vout]. The above mentioned 
exponent is mi = 3 for partial loads under vi(t) 
within [vcin, vR] and mi = 0 for full load under 
vi(t) within [vR, vcout]. Thus, Eq. (1) models the 
OWF energy production interrupted only by out-
of-range wind speeds and down-times due to 
WT failures with the corresponding 
maintenance.  
The rated WT power is the power generated by 
the WT by vi(t) = vR and can be expressed 
through the efficiencies of these main WT 
systems where the energy conversion occurs, 
Schütt (2014): 
    ,  = h   h  h   h   h     , #(2)           
with hrot, hdt, hgen, hrct, hitr are the efficiencies of 
the rotor system,  the drive train (with/without a 
gearbox), the generator, the rectifier and the 
inverter/transformer, respectively. Pw,r indicates 
the mechanical power of the wind at wind 
speeds corresponding to the rated generation 
power. Conversion efficiency is practically a 
constant in a healthy system and a fault leads to 
its decrease, e.g. at the WT gearbox, Feng et al. 
(2011).  
It was also suggested by Staffell and Green 
(2014) that the decrease of the conversion 
efficiency is one of three causes for the 
performance decrease of wind farms during the 
life cycle. Their work indicated that the 
performance of WTs declines about 1.6% each 
year and that the aging may increase the 
likelihood of severe failures. The associated 
decline of the ideal performance can be 
modelled with approach shown in Staffell and 
Green (2014), where the performance is treated 
as a function of age. Through Eq. (2), this can be 
implemented with age dependent efficiency 
factors. In a scenario where the maintenance is 
extremely limited, OWF could be operated 
without preventive maintenance. In our view, 
this may severely affect the reliability. For 
example, insufficient lubrication accelerates the 
aging which will increase the failure rate and 
decrease the remaining useful life of 
components. So, extremely limited maintenance 
can lead to severe failures with large lead times 
caused by the lack of the spare parts and/or times 
to repair, e.g. drive train/gearbox, generator. 
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3.2.2 Failure model design  
Wind turbines suffer from failures during 
operations. In our model, this trait is represented 
by the failure model. The model contains one or 
more fault trees for each of the turbine within 
OWF, Vesely et al. (1981). Different fault trees 
represent different top events. These events can 
require different maintenance actions or 
resources to restore the operations. This aspect is 
discussed further in other sections. In this paper, 
each turbine has two different fault trees to 
represent failures with different severities. 
Each basic event within a fault tree has a failure 
distribution to generate failure times during a 
simulation. Technically any distribution function 
can be used for this. We chose the Weibull 
distribution, Rausand and Høyland (2004), for 
our initial implementation as it is well proven in 
reliability analyses. The distribution is simple 
but versatile, as it can model either age related 
degradation or a failure rate that is decreasing 
over the time. The random failure time t1 as a 
function of random variable u, which is within 
range 0 - 1, follows from: 
  ( ) =    +   +  (− log  )
 
 #(3) 
with t0 is the current time in simulation, ξ is a so-
called threshold parameter that can be used for 
modelling failure free life, λ indicates the scale 
parameter, and α is the shape parameter. 
The maintenance model interacts with the failure 
model using following methods: 
checkNextFailure: provides information on 
when the next failure will occur, which turbine it 
will affect, severity of the failure, and the 
specific system that will fail. 
activateNextFault: activates the aforementioned 
failure. 
restoreItem: restores the condition of an item 
that is specified by the turbine number, severity, 
and event. The current time value is used for 
calculating the next time when the same failure 
will re-occur. 
getStatusList: lists the statuses of each turbine 
that specifies if a turbine is functional or has 
failed. In the latter case, the method provides 
also the severity of the most critical failure 
within a turbine.   
3.2.3 Failure data 
Today, several publications of WT failure data 
exist. We chose to use reference Carroll et al. 
(2016) as the basis for our failure rates because 
the publication also includes information on the 
required number of technicians for different 
maintenance activities. Alternatively, we 
considered using Dao et al. (2019) as a more 
resent source of information, or Athamna  
(2015), which presents a bottom-up approach for 
deriving failure rates for main systems of a WT 
based on failure rates of system components. 
The thesis presents failure rates for the main WT 
types. 
Data in Carroll et al. (2016) are acquired from 
about 350 OWTs that were 3 – 10 years old and 
have a nominal power of 2 – 4 MW. In total, the 
data set consists of 1768 turbine years of 
operations. In that paper, the failures are 
classified based on repair material cost. Our 
analysis does not consider this. Thus, we chose 
to combine categories “no cost data”, “minor 
repair”, and “major repair” as one category as 
there were no major differences between 
required number of technicians or the repair 
time. In the fourth category, “major 
replacement”, these values are generally more 
severe and so we kept it as a separate class. We 
use these data to form a fault trees with a so-
called "Parts Count" approach that was 
introduced in Vesely et al. (1981). With this 
approach, we assume that any failure of a main 
component will cause a WT to be unavailable. 
3.3 Pandemic model 
There are several reasons that can lead to a 
reduction of the available personnel for 
maintenance activities in an OWF. This also 
includes pandemics, like the COVID‑19 crisis. 
For the sake of illustration and out of curiosity, 
we opted for modelling the impact of such a 
pandemic on the available personnel. 
In order to represent the typical progress of the 
COVID‑19 pandemic, we employed the 
Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-Removed 
(SEIR) model presented by Wu et al. (2020),  
6      Bartosz Skobiej and Arto Niemi 
which divides the population into these 
categories, with  the removed representing the 
recovered or deceased individuals. This model 
uses ordinary differential equations for 
estimating when an individual changes from one 
state to another, whereas a change can only be 
from susceptible to exposed to infectious and, 
finally, to removed.  
With help of the project SEIR-fit, we 
parametrized the model with real case data from 
Germany provided by the Johns Hopkins 
University. Next, we extracted the resulting 
basic reproductive number R0 for each type of 
intervention, which are: no interventions (int0), 
curfew (int1), relaxed contact ban (int2) and 
contact ban (int3). Using the SEIR model and 
the respective R0 values, one can estimate the 
pandemic progress for alternative times of the 
interventions. That means, in the pandemic 1 
scenario (see Fig. 3.), no changes to the times of 
interventions have been done. In the worst 
pandemic case scenario, named pandemic 2, we 
delayed the time of establishing the interventions 
by 50% and anticipated the time of removal of 
the interventions by 50%. Furthermore, we 
defined for each intervention a planned 
reduction of personnel with following reduction 
values: int1: 20%, int2: 30% and int3: 50%. 
Additionally, we defined that each exposed or 
infected individual affects on average nine other 
people that must also stay in lockdown. Finally, 
we estimated for each of the two pandemic 
scenarios the daily percentage reduction of 
available personnel by adding the decrease due 
to interventions and ordered lockdown.  
As can be seen in Fig. 3, pandemic model 
delivers data for two scenarios: pandemic 1 and 
pandemic 2. Scenarios named normal and red50 
(reduction ca. 50%) are introduced in the 
section 4.1. 
4. Experiments  
This section presents the results obtained for 
four personnel availability scenarios. All of the 
experiments were conducted with the same 
failure events provided and with the same 
weather conditions. 
4.1 Parameters 
We set up an OWF consisting of 30 WTs that 
have an average distance of 30 km from the 
shore, which corresponds to halve of the 
distance a vessel has to travel per mission. The 
corrective maintenance personnel have access to 
1 HLV and 5 FSVs in normal scenario. 
Furthermore, we divided the standard available 
personnel for unscheduled maintenance 
activities into a summer and winter allocations. 
This follows from the observation that during 
winter season the times of acceptable weather 
conditions for maintenance activities are 
strongly reduced, which requires a higher 
parallelism of missions in order to assure 
acceptable Operational Availability (OA) of the 
OWF. That means the scenario normal employs 
during winter season a personnel of 50 people, 
while during summer season the personnel 
amount drops to 25. Based on these numbers, 
three additional scenarios have been constructed 
– pandemic 1 and pandemic 2 (see also Section 
3.3) as well as red50, during which the available 
personnel corresponds to 50% of the standard 
personnel. The resulting values of the available 
personnel are depicted in Fig. 3. The weather 
values are taken from NOAA, (2019) for the 
period of 12 months of 2019. The failure rates 
are based on Carroll et al. (2016), as described in 
Section 3.2. The energy production has been 
calculated assuming WTs capacity of 3.5MW 
each.  
For the sake of the presented analysis, we 
assumed a constant availability of all 
maintenance vessels as well as spare parts. 
4.2 Scenario Analysis 
Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 focus on the OA in a yearly and 
monthly view. It is shown in Fig. 4 that the 
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lowest yearly OA level of ca. 55% was reached 
by the red50 scenario. Meanwhile, the normal 
scenario resulted in yearly OA of ca. 84%. Both  
pandemic scenarios results in ca. OA of 76% and 
78%, respectively what may suggest that 
constant reduction of available personnel has 
more impact on the OA KPI than short-term (up 
to 2 months) absences of significant number of 
personnel. However, one can notice in Fig. 5 for 
the pandemic 2 scenario that the highest drop pf 
OA is coincidentally during the summer time, 
which usually has good weather conditions. 
Shifting the pandemic 2 personnel unavailability 
“valley” from summer to winter time may 
influence the OA KPI in a significant way. 
Fig. 6 depicts the Mean Time To Repair 
(MTTR) values for one year, which correlate 
with the results shown in Fig. 4. The results 
indicate that a 50% reduced crew availability 
leads to up to 30% reduction of the OA in 
comparison to normal scenario. This reduction 
further results in a MTTR that is 3 times higher 
than in the normal scenario.  
When regarding OA and MTTR values obtained 
for pandemic scenarios one should keep in mind 
that the market integrals of pandemic 1 and 
pandemic 2 curves have similar values (see 
Fig 3). That might explain lack of significant 
differences between both pandemic models.   
Fig. 7 shows the monthly values of energy 
production in GWh. The ideal values were 
estimated based on available wind speed data 
and can be regarded as potential energy 
production levels. The results indicate that in the 
beginning of the year, the red50 scenario is 
heavily affected by the lack of personnel. The 
drops in energy production reach the level of 
3.97GWh in May. In contrast, pandemic 1 and 
pandemic 2 scenarios produced 5.85GWh and 
6.17GWh of energy respectively. One can also 
observe how close to the ideal energy production 
levels all considered scenarios are located in a 
May-August period. 
5. Conclusions 
In this work, we present a model for the analysis 
of the impact of personnel availability on 
maintenance processes in Offshore Wind Farms 
(OWF). The model consists of the four sub-
 
Fig. 4. Operational Availability (OA) after one year 
for considered scenarios 
 
Fig. 5. OA for each month of considered scenarios 
Fig. 6.  the Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) for one 
year of considered scenarios 
 
Fig. 7. Monthly energy production in GWh for one 
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systems O&M, failure generation, pandemic and 
energy provision. Results indicate that the time 
between occurrence of a failure and its repair 
can increase by more than factor 3 in case of a 
constant reduction of the personnel by 50%, 
while a worst case pandemic scenario resulted in 
a 17% lower energy production over the whole 
year. This clearly shows that future works 
should explore how O&M must be improved in 
order to reduce its susceptibility against the loss 
of maintenance personnel. 
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